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The severity of the financial crisis resulting from the
collapse of the US market for real-estate and subprime
loans in 2007 has caused a large-scale economic reces-
sion and prompted a major rethink of financial regu-
lation. The magnitude of the crisis, the worst since that
of the 1930s, amplified by the market channels in a
global market and the weaknesses in the regulation
and supervision of financial entities that it revealed,
has spotlighted the issue of financial regulatory
reform. The crisis triggered by the subprime loan mar-
ket became systemic in the wake of the failure of
Lehman Brothers in September 2008, endangering the
stability of the international financial system. The sov-
ereign debt crisis, which started in 2010 with problems
in Greece, Ireland and Portugal and recently spread to
Italy and Spain, has provoked another wave of sys-
temic problems centring on banks in the euro area.
Why and how have regulatory mechanisms failed?
Have there been new market failures? What can be
learnt from the crisis? Does it have specific implica-
tions for the financial architecture of the European
Union and the euro area? The answers to such ques-
tions will reveal the key issues to be taken into
account when designing adequate regulation and will
determine whether a radical reformulation of the reg-
ulatory framework is needed. 
In EEAG (2003), Chapter 4, we argued that there
were at least three open problems with the financial
architecture of the euro area. Firstly, we indicated
that the provisions made may not adequately guaran-
tee financial stability. Secondly, and to a large extent,
these provisions hindered European financial market
integration; and finally, they also hindered the com-
petitiveness of EU financial markets and institutions.
We stated that: “The present gradualist approach
may yield more costs than benefits in the long-term
and may end up proving ineffective. It would be bet-
ter not to wait for a major crisis to strike in order to
put the house in order”.1 Well, now that a major cri-
sis has struck, where does that leave us? In EEAG
(2003), Chapter 4, we highlighted the need to estab-
lish clear procedures for crisis lending and crisis man-
agement with the European Central Bank (ECB) at
their centre, and to confront the fiscal issue of how to
provide help to a transnational institution. We also
advocated more centralised supervisory arrange-
ments in banking, insurance and securities in the
medium and long run.
Against this background, Section 3.2 of this chapter
overviews the crisis and its regulatory failures.
Section 3.3 deals with ongoing regulatory reform,
while Section 3.4 analyses competition policy and its
interaction with regulation. In Sections 3.5 and 3.6 we
look at the reform of the European Union’s financial
architecture and regulatory framework. The chapter
then closes with some concluding remarks.
3.2 The crisis and regulatory failure
3.2.1 The crisis
The financial sector is plagued by all of the classical
market failures. Firstly, a bankruptcy of a banking
institution causes important externalities, especially
if the institution is systemic, to the rest of the finan-
cial sector and to the real economy. Fragility, conta-
gion and investor coordination problems are ubiqui-
tous in the financial system. Secondly, information
asymmetries in financial markets leave the small
investor unprotected on the one hand, and may lead
to market collapse because of adverse selection on
the other. At the same time, widespread conflicts of
interest between shareholders and depositors, as well
as moral hazard, lead to excessive risk-taking, which
is exacerbated by insurance and aid mechanisms
aimed at avoiding the bankruptcy of systemic enti-
ties. Thirdly, there is the market power issue, since
many banking sectors tend to be concentrated and
have high barriers to entry. Finally, we could add
that the limited rationality of economic agents may
amplify financial cycles and encourage speculative
bubbles.
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1 EEAG (2003), Chapter 4, p. 98.The whole regulatory framework has been called into
question by the crisis. The current EU sovereign debt
crisis, with its menacing second wave of systemic risk,
has once again exposed the weaknesses of the regula-
tory framework.
The originate-to-distribute model and the inverted
pyramid of complex derivatives based on subprime
mortgages were at the heart of the problems in the
2008 crisis. Mortgage supervision was in limbo,
opaque and, given the complexity of the instruments,
led to the undervaluation of risk. Besides, mortgage
risk goes back to banks’ balance sheets when struc-
tured investment vehicles (SIV) have liquidity prob-
lems due to explicit and implicit commitments of the
entities. Risk undervaluation was reinforced by the
use of statistical models based on short time series
and historical correlations (and probability distribu-
tions with little weight on the tails), disregarding the
systemic risk implied by these new instruments and
high levels of leverage. Mechanical models for risk
assessment, which only work within a range of very
limited parameters, were overused. Furthermore,
short-term wholesale funding proved to be a crucial
weakness characterising the balance sheets of many
financial institutions, as shown by the cases of
Northern Rock and Lehman Brothers or, more re  -
cently, Dexia.
A whole chain of misaligned incentives led to cata-
strophe. Government agencies in the United States
promoted subprime mortgages, which were granted to
families with little chance of repaying their loan; cred-
it rating agencies, aligned with the issuer, competed to
grant the most favourable ratings to the riskiest prod-
ucts, and short-term compensation for agents encour-
aged excessive risk-taking. This chain was oiled by the
very low interest rates which financed the housing
bubble. Monetary policy was totally focused on infla-
tion; without any concern for bubbles in asset value or
the fragile balance sheets of financial institutions.
Surprisingly, the model of monetary policy imple-
mented by central banks does not give any role to
financial intermediation.
There is also debate over the extent to which pressure
to offer value to shareholders and inefficiencies in cor-
porate governance mechanisms have contributed to
the crisis. The existence of both deposit insurance and
explicit and implicit too big to fail (TBTF) policies
limits the responsibility of shareholders, encouraging
them to demand high risk-taking, since profits are pri-
vate and losses, in the case of bankruptcy, are social  -
ised. In such cases shareholders design compensation
packages to benefit those executives who promote
risk-taking whereby compensation is not sensitive to
profit decreases (by means of guaranteed bonuses, for
instance), but is sensitive to increases. Fresh evidence
shows that this took place before the crisis.2 There
may also be the additional problem of a conflict of
interest between shareholders and executives, and
between executives and traders of intermediaries. 
What past and current crises have in common is
maturity mismatch (excessive maturity transforma-
tion) in highly leveraged institutions, contagion due
to interbank exposure and the coordination prob-
lems of investors who encourage interbank and com-
mercial paper market participants not to renew their
credit lines out of fear that others may not do so
either. This led to the collapse of the asset-backed
commercial paper market (securitization) and the
associated collapse of the interbank market. The
globalisation of financial markets potentially entails
greater diversification, but also increases the likeli-
hood of contagion with domino effects between enti-
ties and contagion due to information problems. The
opacity of the new financial instruments known as
derivatives plays a crucial role: it leads to underesti-
mation of the huge systemic risk accumulated in the
system, and offers no clear knowledge of the magni-
tude or of the exposures to the toxic products
derived from subprime mortgages. This problem of
asymmetric information paralyses interbank mar-
kets and renders them illiquid. 
At the root of the problem of the interbank and
money markets’ lack of resiliency lies a lack of infor-
mation on the position of the banks in those mar-
kets. The complex, opaque web of over-the-counter
(OTC) transactions made by large banks explains
why relatively small shocks, like the subprime crisis
or the problems with Greek debt, provoke such large
effects via contagion. A major problem is that the
decentralised trading of bank reserves lumps togeth-
er the original liquidity risk with counterparty risk,3
increasing the adverse selection problem enormous-
ly. A potential solution is to move OTC transactions
to a central counterparty clearing system (which is
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2 See Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), Cheng et al. (2010), Bebchuk
and Spamann (2010), and Bebchuk et al. (2010). In that sense, it is
also possible to interpret the statement of Chuck Prince, executive
director at Citigroup (Financial Times, July 2007): “when the music
stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long
as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re still
dancing.”
3 Counterparty risk is the probability that the other party in a trans-
action may not fulfill its part of the deal and may default on the con-
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transparent and centralises collateral and margin re  -
quirements).4
The opacity of OTC trading and the lack of a guar-
anteed central clearing counterparty may help explain
why contagion from a relatively small problem in a
market, like subprime mortgages in the United States
or Greek sovereign debt in the euro area, has spread
widely. 
3.2.2 Major regulatory failures
Regulation has tried to alleviate market deficiencies
with measures such as deposit insurance, with the cen-
tral bank acting as lender of last resort, as well as with
prudential and supervision requirements. The Basel II
framework allows banks to trust their own internal
models to assess and control risk and includes the
demand for public disclosure of information on the
part of financial institutions to encourage transparen-
cy and foster market discipline. 
However, the whole regulatory framework has been
called into question by the crisis. Firstly, dual regu-
lation allows regulatory arbitrage between the regu-
lated sector of depository institutions and the paral-
lel banking system of structured vehicles and invest-
ment banks. Secondly, capital requirements in terms
of quantity and quality were insufficient, while liq-
uidity needs were disregarded. In the 2008 crisis
there was a double failure of the banks’ ability to
bear losses (they did not have enough equity capital
to cover the risks taken5) and of bank debt, which
proved poor at absorbing losses when the layer of
equity capital was eroded. To make matters worse,
capital requirements are pro-cyclical. Furthermore,
along the cycle, market value accounting also has
pro-cyclical characteristics. Regulation does not give
sufficient consideration to systemic risk. The opacity
of the parallel banking system and of OTC deriva-
tives markets has helped to conceal systemic risk.
Finally, even although credit rating agencies play a
very important role in regulation (for example, when
determining capital needs), they competed with each
other via lower rating standards without the ade-
quate supervision of the regulator.
Critical questioning of the regulatory framework has
concentrated on the lack of macroprudential regula-
tion to limit the two main sources of system-wide
financial risk: pro-cyclicality and inter-linkages in the
financial system.
In general, regulation has not paid sufficient attention
to conflicts of interest and has relied excessively on
mechanisms of self-regulation and corporate gover-
nance. The influence of the financial sector, and of
investment banks in particular, via lobbying may have
contributed to lax regulations. 
3.3 Regulatory reform 
Governments have responded to the crisis with initia-
tives carried out by the Financial Stability Board
(FSB) and the Bank for International Settlements
(BIS), as well as through proposals and legislative
changes in the United States, the United Kingdom
and the European Union. 
Solvency and liquidity requirements for the banking
sector are set to increase substantially as a conse-
quence of the new Basel regulatory framework
(known as Basel III, see EEAG (2011), Chapter 5).
This regulation aims to make entities capable of
absorbing unanticipated losses and to forestall poten-
tial contagion between entities. The quantity (stricter
solvency ratios) and the quality (fewer hybrid instru-
ments such as preferred stock or subordinate debt) of
the capital base will be raised, with the inclusion of
countercyclical buffers, and liquidity requirements to
adjust and moderate the industry’s maturity transfor-
mation. These requirements will entail higher costs
for institutions and potentially lower credit levels in
the short term.6
In November 2011, the G-20 endorsed the FSB’s pro-
posal regarding the treatment of Global Systemically
Important Financial Institutions (G-SIFIs).7 The
FSB simultaneously published an initial list of
29 identified G-SIFIs. This list will be updated annu-
ally. The G-SIFIs will need to have additional loss
absorption capacity tailored to the impact of their
default, rising from 1 percent to 2.5 percent or 3.5 per-
cent of risk-weighted assets to be met with common
equity and with full implementation in 2019. G-SIFIs
will have more intensive and effective supervision of
4 See Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2010), Duffie (2011) and
Rochet (2010).
5 Leverage ratios of assets to equity capital had ballooned to around
forty times – twice historically normal levels. This was allowed to
happen in part because there was no restriction on leverage, but
instead limits on the ratio of capital to ‘risk-weighted’ assets, but the
supposed ‘risk weights’ turned out to be unreliable measures of risk:
they were going down when risk was in fact going up.
6 BIS’ estimates on the short term effects are quite moderate, while
those carried out by the financial sector are much more dramatic.
7 See http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104bb.pdf.risk management functions, data aggregation capabil-
ities, risk governance and internal controls by 2016.
The proposal brings broader powers and tools to the
resolution authority (including statutory bail-in), and
institution-specific minimum cross-border coopera-
tion arrangements between national authorities to
facilitate the collective resolution of cross-border
firms. It also adds a framework for assessing and
implementing resolution processes. By 2012 it is
expected that the framework for the G-SIFIs will be
extended to domestic systemically important banks
and non-bank financial entities. 
In addition, taxes and levies to absorb the shocks that
systemic entities bring into the financial system are
being debated on an international level. Accounting
procedures will become more homogeneous (in a con-
vergence process between the United States and the
European Union) and the definition of capital will be
harmonised to facilitate international comparisons, the
treatment of off-balance sheet items and fair value esti-
mates of assets in illiquid markets. Executive and
employee compensation packages are being thoroughly
reviewed in an attempt to control entities’ risk-taking,
as well as the banking sector’s corporate governance. 
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Box 3.1  
Regulation in the European Union 
 
In July 2011 the European Commission presented a proposal to make Europe the first region to adopt, with some 
differences, the proposed “Basel III Agreements”.
1 The proposal contains a Directive that: 
 
•  sets stricter requirements for the mechanisms and processes of corporate governance and increases oversight 
of risk management by Boards of Directors and supervisors; 
•  seeks to ensure the deterrent power, effectiveness and proportionality of the sanctions imposed by supervisors 
in case of violation of the requirements of the European Union;
2  
•  proposes both a capital conservation buffer (unique for all banks) and a counter-cyclical buffer to be defined 
by each member state;  
•  requires supervisory institutions to submit an annual monitoring program specific to each entity based on risk 
analysis, more extensive tests and more systematic and rigorous rules;  
•  and seeks to reduce the influence of rating agencies by recommending internal risk assessment in making 
investment decisions and in calculating capital requirements related to certain significant holdings.  
 
A Single Rule Book ensures the uniform application of prudential requirements contained in Basel III by all 
members, with more stringent requirements allowed only in cases of risk to financial stability or specific risk 
profiles of certain entities.  
 
In July 2011, the European Parliament endorsed a Commission proposal on short-selling securities and certain 
aspects of credit default swaps (CDS) trading with the aim of increasing transparency and reducing risk by 
implementing a harmonised European framework for reporting requirements. The proposal allows the regulators to 
temporarily ban short selling in any financial instrument in exceptional situations and to prohibit naked short sales 
in equity and sovereign debt.
3  
 
In June 2010 the European Council recommended introducing a system of taxes and levies on both a European and 
a global level. In late September 2011 the European Commission presented a proposal for a financial transaction 
tax (FTT) to become effective on 1 January 2014 at an EU level, with three main goals: to increase the financial 
sector's contribution relative to the cost of the crisis, to reduce the riskiness of financial markets by discouraging 
speculative transactions (such as high frequency trading); and to ensure harmonisation at an EU level to avoid 
distortions of the Single Market. The minimum tax (0.1 percent for bonds and shares and 0.01 percent for 
derivatives) will apply to any exchange of financial instruments between financial institutions.
4 Germany  and 
France support the European Commission FTT proposal, but the United Kingdom is opposed to it because, without 
a broad international agreement, there is concern over the prospect of a massive exodus of investors from London 
to other financial centres. There is also debate over the fate of the revenue raised and whether it should end up in 
the hands of the European Union or its member countries. Finally, the European Commission has also proposed 
measures to limit payments to departing bank executives and to ban the CEO from being the Chairman of the 
Board. 
 
1 European Commission, Revision of the Capital Requirements Directives (CRD IV), 20 July 2011. 
2 Administrative penalties may be up to 10 percent of annual turnover of the entity, as well as temporary bans on members of the 
governing body. 
3 In the words of European officials: “Short selling is the sale of a security that the seller does not own, with the intention of 
buying back an identical security at a later point in time to be able to deliver the security. It can be divided into two types: 
‘covered’ short selling where the seller has made arrangements to borrow the securities before the sale and ‘naked’ short selling 
where the seller has not borrowed the securities when the short sale occurs”. 
4 Primary markets transactions, transactions between financial institutions and the Central Bank and currency transactions on the 
spot market would be exempted. 
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Boxes 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 deal, respectively, with regula-
tory developments in the European Union, the
United States and the United Kingdom. It is particu-
larly worth noting the UK proposal to ring-fence
commercial off from investment banking activities in
universal banks.
3.4 Competition issues
The relationship between competition, fragility and
risk-taking is complex, but both theory and empirics
support the idea that an increase in the level of com-
petition, beyond some threshold, will tend to
increase risk-taking incentives and the probability of
bank failure. This tendency may be checked by the
reputational concerns of the institutions, by the pres-
ence of private costs of managerial failure, or, more
importantly, by appropriate regulation and super  -
vision.8
In the European Union the competition authority has
played an active role in controlling the distortions
introduced by public help because it has the unique
capability, among competition authorities, to control
state aid. The important side benefit of state aid con-
trol in the European Union is that it limits the incen-
tives of bankers to take excessive risk in the expecta-
tion of a bail-out if things go wrong. In other words,
it addresses the TBTF issue. The competition author-
ity may internalise that competition will be distorted
if an institution that fails gets help. To limit the size
(or better the systemically-corrected size) of an insti-
tution with divestitures once it receives public help
(something that the European Union seems to be
implementing) is an option, which extends the realm
of competition policy. The competition authority in
its role of protecting competition may have a say in
the TBTF issue and therefore its actions should be
coordinated with the regulator. The activism of the
European Commission poses the question of compet-
itive balance with those US banks which were recapi-
talised and for which no divestitures were required
(see Box 3.4).
 
Box 3.2  
The new regulatory framework in the United States 
 
The Dodd-Frank Act passed in the United States in July 2010 is an effort to strengthen regulation and supervision. 
The most significant changes include: 
 
•  the set-up of the Financial Stability Oversight Council, a council of regulators, charged with identifying 
entities of systemic importance, which will be subject to tougher requirements in terms of liquidity, capital and 
leverage;  
•  enhanced consumer protection regarding lack of information on financial products; restrictions on banks to 
trade on their own behalf (Volcker rule
1);  
•  greater transparency in clearing mechanisms and derivatives transactions;  
•  improved resolution mechanisms whereby regulators will be able to take charge and put troubled financial 
institutions into liquidation when their bankruptcy would jeopardise the stability of the system, whereby 
shareholders and unsecured creditors would bear losses.
2  
 
Entities of systemic importance may be subject to additional requirements at the regulator’s discretion, including a 
reduction of their complexity, the adoption of “wills” to establish resolution procedures in case of bankruptcy, 
increased capital requirements, the introduction of debt instruments which turn into shares under certain conditions, 
leverage restrictions
3  and the set-up of independently capitalised subsidiaries. Derivatives transactions shall be 
performed through centralised platforms and not through OTC transactions, which shall remain under federal 
supervision. Prudential and transparency rules are set to the securitization market. Issuers shall retain five percent 
of the risk to ensure that they take greater care in underwriting loans. The Bureau of Consumer Financial 
Protection has also been created to help recover investor confidence and solve conflicts of interest. Credit rating 
agencies shall be subject to Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) supervision. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, 
shareholders are also required to express their non-binding opinion on executives’ pay. 
 
1 The passed law was a diluted version of the initial Volcker rule: banks will be able to invest up to 3 percent of their Tier 1 capital 
in proprietary trading and they will also be able to invest up to 3 percent of the Tier 1 capital in hedge funds and private equity 
funds. 
2 Before the reform, regulators were only able to bail-out or allow the bankruptcy of non-financial institutions in trouble (as in the 
cases of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and AIG). The liquidation costs of an entity shall be financed by a tax levied (after the 
bankruptcy) on financial institutions with assets exceeding 50 billion dollars. 
3 In the United States, Bank Holding Companies already have a maximum debt-to-capital ratio of 24 (capital to total assets of  
4 percent). Under the Dodd-Frank Act current restrictions are maintained as minimum requirements, but the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council is authorised to set its own debt-to-capital ratio of 15:1 if the entity entails a risk to financial stability. 
 
8 See Vives (2010, 2011a,b) for a more complete development of the
arguments in this section.The crisis has forced mergers of institutions backed
by government subsidies and/or guarantees. The
upshot is that some surviving incumbents have
increased their market power and have a lower cost
of capital because they are TBTF (and/or because of
the public help). A merger policy must have a long
horizon, and even in a crisis situation, it must con-
sider the optimal degree of concentration in the
industry, dynamic incentives for prudence of incum-
bents and the ease of entry. The consolidation
brought by the crisis should not be problematic if the
increased market power of the merged institutions is
a temporary reward for past prudent behaviour that
will fade away with new entry. However, if the mar-
ket power consolidates due to barriers to entry into
banking then consumers and investors will suffer the
consequences. An active competition policy will be
needed in that case.
Size and scope restrictions are blunt instruments for
dealing with the TBTF issue. Controls on size are
problematic because interconnectedness and line of
business specialisation are more important than size
for systemic risk. With regard to the scope of the
banking firm, conflict of interest is what leads to
potential market failure and effectively indicates pos-
sible scope limitations. Higher capital and insurance
charges for systemically important institutions togeth-
er with effective resolution procedures may be a better
way of dealing with the problem. This should be cou-
pled with a serious consideration of conflicts of inter-
est in financial conglomerates. Given the limitations
of behavioural regulation, structural restrictions seem
warranted. The upshot is that the competition author-
ity in its role of protecting competition may have a say
in the TBTF issue and therefore its actions should be
coordinated with the regulator. The potential for
competition policy to provide a commitment device to
partially address TBTF issues should not be dis-
missed. 
In the United Kingdom, the proposal from the Inde  -
pendent Commission on Banking to ring-fence retail
activities from investment banking activities (in sepa-
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Box 3.3  
New proposals on regulation and competition in the United Kingdom 
 
The Independent Commission on Banking (ICB), established by the UK Government, considered the benefits of a 
structural separation between domestic retail services and global wholesale and investment banking operations and 
concluded in September 2011 that the best policy is to require retail ring-fencing of UK banks, not total separation.
1 
The objective would be to isolate those banking activities (the taking of deposits from, and provision of overdrafts 
to ordinary individuals and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)) where continuous provision of service is 
vital to the economy and to bank’s customers, from global external financial shocks. This would require banks’ UK 
retail activities to be carried out in separate subsidiaries. The following services should not be permitted in the ring-
fence: services to non-EEA (European Economic Area) customers, services (other than payments services) 
resulting in exposure to financial customers, ‘trading book’ activities, services relating to secondary markets 
activity (including the purchases of loans or securities), and derivatives trading (except as necessary for the retail 
bank prudently to manage its own risk). Subject to limits on the wholesale funding of retail operations, other 
banking services – including taking deposits from customers other than individuals and SMEs and lending to large 
companies outside the financial sector – should be permitted (but not required) within the ring-fence. The retail 
ring-fence would affect between one sixth and one third of the aggregate balance sheet of UK banks.  
 
Retail ring-fencing banking activities should meet regulatory requirements for capital, liquidity, funding and large 
exposures on a standalone basis, and the permitted extent of its relationships with other parts should be conducted 
on an arm’s length basis: independent governance and disclosures and reports as if it were an independently listed 
company. Given regulatory failure up to the crisis, the ICB recommends raising the capital standards for UK banks 
in relation to international recommendations. Furthermore, the supervisor should be able to require the banks to 
have additional primary loss-absorbing capacity if it has concerns about its ability to be resolved at minimum risk 
to the public purse. The resolution authorities should have a primary and a secondary bail-in power allowing them 
to impose losses on unsecured debt (bail-in bonds) in a resolution procedure before imposing losses on other non-
capital, non-subordinated liabilities. In insolvency or resolution, all insured depositors should rank ahead of other 
creditors to the extent that those creditors are either unsecured or only secured with a floating charge. 
 
Implementation of these reforms should be completed at the latest by the Basel III date of the start of 2019. In the 
Final Report, the ICB also made some recommendations about competition issues derived from the changes to UK 
banks after the crisis. These included measures to lower switching and entry costs, and to give the new Financial 
Conduct Authority (see Box 3.6) a new primary duty to promote competition. 
 
1 See ICB (2011). 
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rately capitalised divisions of a bank holding compa-
ny (ICB 2011), see Box 3.4) is a compromise to allevi-
ate the gambling problem with public insurance, while
allowing some scope economies within banking activ-
ities. This structural measure has the potential to alle-
viate the problem, but will not eliminate it. One rea-
son is that the definition of the boundary between the
divisions will leave an important grey area and gener-
ate perverse incentives. Another reason is that the reg-
ulatory boundary problem persists: risky activities
migrate to areas where regulation is lax and reproduce
the problems that we have witnessed during the crisis
in the shadow banking system. The outcome may be
that the investment bank part may need to be rescued
if it becomes systemic.
3.5 Financial architecture in the European Union: 
the new supervisory framework
A new European supervisory framework, the Euro  -
pean System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), was
introduced in January 2011. Its aim is to strengthen
financial supervision by empowering regulatory bod-
ies and replacing existing ones (that could only issue
non-binding guidelines and recommendations), and
to ensure the effectiveness of the decisions taken in
emergency situation. 
The ESFS consists of the European Systemic Risk
Board (ESRB) and three European Supervisory
Authorities (ESAs): the European Banking Authority
 
Box 3.4  
Competition policy and regulation in the European Union and the United States 
 
European Union 
The European Union dealt with many banking aid cases during the crisis (taking 22 decisions only in 2008 and  
81 decisions up to December 17, 2009). Most of the cases (75) were approved without objection.
1 The European 
Union has stated a number of conditions for state guarantees/recapitalisation including: non-discriminatory access 
to state help to maintain a level playing field among institutions and banking sectors; help should be limited in time 
and scope (only necessary liabilities); it should be accompanied by a contribution from the private sector and by 
appropriate market-oriented remuneration for support or recapitalisation. Furthermore, beneficiaries should be 
subject to some behavioural rules, incentives should be given for state capital to be withdrawn eventually, and a 
distinction should be made between fundamentally sound (but potentially distressed because of contagion) and 
other distressed banks (with recapitalisation for fundamentally sound institutions only).  
 
The regulatory tools used by the European Union are structural (with balance sheet reductions and divestitures) and 
behavioural (with restrictions on pricing, publicity or compensation for employees). Some of the measures can be 
understood in terms of minimising competitive distortions of the aid and others in terms of checking moral hazard 
in the future. The important point is that even the measures purely aimed at competitive distortions will have an 
impact on ex ante incentives since a bank will know that help will be given with restrictions in case of trouble.  
 
In the European Union a further potential contradiction between merger control and financial stability concerns 
arises. According to the European Merger Regulation, member states may block a merger to protect financial 
stability in the domestic market. Thus, it is questionable whether individual member states could implement this 
exception to fend off foreign entry




The Obama administration, following the advice of Paul Volcker, advocated limits on the size and scope (mostly in 
terms of proprietary trading) of banks to avoid the TBTF problem as well as to control risk-taking. What the 
European Commission tried to accomplish with state aid control, the United States and the United Kingdom may 
try to accomplish via regulation. The Dodd-Frank Act has introduced a mild version of the limits on proprietary 
trading and strengthened some limits on size (by extending the Riegle-Neal Act 1994 which prohibits any merger or 
acquisition that results in the combined banking organisation controlling more than ten percent of domestic deposits 
at the national level to all types of depositary institutions, and introducing a concentration limit to any consolidation 
of financial companies of ten percent of financial industry liabilities).
4  
 
1 With 66 more cases cleared under a temporary framework to support lending to firms (DG Competition (December 17, 2009), 
State aid: overview of national measures adopted as a response to the financial/economic crisis). See Beck et al. (2010) for a 
thorough analysis and policy evaluation of bank bail-outs in Europe during the crisis.  
2 This has been the case, for example, in Portugal (case Banco Santander/Champalimaud Group in 1999), and Italy (cases 
BNL/BBVA in 2005; ABN AMRO/Antonveneta in 2005; Unicredito/HVB in 2006). This contrasts with the attitude of the United 
Kingdom in the merger of Santander/Abbey or of the Netherlands with the three-way acquisition and split of ABN AMRO. 
3 See Carletti and Vives (2009).  
4 A banking organisation could exceed the deposit cap with internal growth, but it would not be allowed to engage in any more 
mergers or acquisitions. Please note, however, that a national cap on market share for deposits should not be relevant from an 
antitrust perspective since the relevant markets from the competition perspective for retail and small and medium size enterprises 
are local. 
 (EBA); the European Insurance and Occupational
Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and the European
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). The
ESFS also comprises of the Joint Committee of the
ESAs and the competent or supervisory authorities in
each member state. By December of 2013 the
European Parliament and the European Council shall
review this framework (see Figure 3.1).
The two pillars of the new supervisory framework
are the ESRB in charge of macro-prudential super-
vision and the ESAs in charge of micro-prudential
supervision. The objective of the latter is to safe-
guard financial soundness at the level of individual
financial firms and to protect consumers of financial
services.
The main objectives of the new supervisory frame-
work are to:
￿ help restore confidence in the financial system and
specifically in delegated monitoring by public
supervisors, rating agencies, auditors or securitiza-
tion agents;
￿ contribute to the development of a single rulebook
to issue directly applicable binding technical stan-
dards in key prudential areas, to issue binding
interpretations of all EU legislation and to under-
take reviews of national supervisors;9
￿ strengthen cross-border institutions, increasing the
micro-macro link in risk assessment and in the
design of regulation;
￿ prevent the build-up of risks that threaten the sta-
bility of the overall financial system, (e.g. regulat-
ing banks TBTF).
The ESRB is responsible for the macro-prudential
oversight of the financial system within the European
Union. It shall contribute to the prevention or miti-
gation of systemic risks to financial stability in the
European Union that arise from developments with-
in the financial system and taking into account
macroeconomic developments, so as to avoid periods
of widespread financial distress. It shall contribute to
the smooth functioning of the internal market and
thereby ensure a sustainable contribution by the
financial sector to economic growth. It covers not
only banks, but also other financial institutions, mar-
kets, products and market infrastructures. The ESRB
must identify systemic risks, vulnerabilities and emer-
gency situations. At the same time it must issue rec-
ommendations (including, where appropriate, for leg-
islative initiatives) and early warnings (public or con-
fidential) to the European Council, the three ESAs
and national supervisory authorities, as well as mon-
itoring follow-up. 
The ESRB shall coordinate its actions with those of
international financial organisations, particularly the
IMF and the FSB, as well as the relevant bodies in
third countries on matters related to macro-pruden-
tial oversight.
The ESRB can request information from the ESAs
in an aggregate form or individually if the requested
financial institution is deemed to be systemically rel-
evant. 
The three ESAs will work on micro-prudential
supervision in a network with the existing national
supervisory authorities. Their additional compe-
tences are:
￿ developing proposals for techni-
cal standards to better define
common standards for the
application of legislative acts,
respecting better regulation
principles and monitoring the
application at national level;
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- Chair and the two Vice-
   Chairs of the ESRB Advisory
   Scientific Committee
- Chair of the ESRB Advisory
   Technical Committee
Without voting rights:
- One representative (per member) of
   the national supervisory authorities
- President of the EU Economic and
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9 According to European authorities,
national supervisors of cross-border
groups were to co-operate within colleges
of supervisors, but if they could not agree,
there was no mechanism to resolve issues.
Many technical rules were determined at a
member state level, and there was consid-
erable variation between member states.
Even in cases where rules were har-
monised, their application could be incon-
sistent.EEAG Report 2012 91
Chapter 3
￿ resolving cases of disagreement between national
supervisors, where legislation requires them to
cooperate or to agree;
￿ contributing to ensuring consistent application of
existing and future technical EU rules (including
through peer reviews); 
￿ and coordinating in emergency situations or pre-
venting threats to the correct functioning of the
financial markets, taking actions such as the ban-
ning of operations, but that do not have fiscal
effects for the member states (such as bail-outs).
The ESAs will be able to take decisions directly
applicable to individual financial institutions if the
national supervisor does not comply with the decision
of the ESAs, and only in cases where there is directly
applicable EU legislation.
Specifically, the main objectives of the European
Banking Authority (EBA) are to:
￿ prevent regulatory arbitrage;
￿ guarantee a level playing field;
￿ strengthen coordination among international
supervision;
￿ promote supervisory convergence; 
￿ provide advice to EU institutions in the areas of
banking, payments and e-money regulation, as
well as on issues related to corporate governance,
auditing and financial reporting.
The EIOPA has a responsibility to protect policy-
holders, pension scheme members and beneficiaries,
and to act in an emergency crisis. The ESMA is
responsible for fostering supervisory convergence
among national supervisors, coordinating the actions
of securities supervisors and adopting emergency
measures in a crisis situation. The ESMA also direct-
ly oversees credit rating agencies, since their services
are used around Europe.
The new supervisory framework is a step in the right
direction, particularly in terms of crisis prevention,
but it still lags behind the reality of financial inte-
gration and the possibilities of banking problem
contagion in the European Union, particularly in the
euro area. 
In EEAG (2003) we stated that: “deeper and more
integrated markets increase diversification possibili-
ties, but at the same time raise potential problems of
contagion and liquidity crises.” The report forecasted
that: “the fragility of the banking system may well
increase in the short term.” It also stated that: “regu-
latory fragmentation in Europe is a major obstacle to
financial integration. It reduces the international
competitiveness of European markets and institu-
tions, and poses a threat to the stability of the finan-
cial sector”.10 Given that the value of centralised
authority with appropriate information is enhanced in
crisis situations, we recommended that the responsi-
bility for financial stability should be born by the
ESCB and the ECB in particular. We also advised the
ESCB to establish and make public a formal frame-
work of crisis resolution clearly identifying the chain
of command in a crisis situation. Furthermore, the
burden sharing issue in case of failure should be con-
fronted: “A formal mechanism of co-operation
should be established between the ECB, the national
central banks and/or national supervisors, and the
national treasuries to clarify responsibilities, establish
information sharing protocols, and elucidate who
would pay for failed (insolvent) institutions that have
been helped”.11 We presented two alternative models
for the future: in the first model prudential supervi-
sion of banks is in the hands of the ESCB with the
ECB having a central role while European-wide spe-
cialised regulators in insurance and securities are con-
stituted. In the second model, an integrated regulator
of banking, insurance and markets – a European
Financial Services Authority (EFSA) – is formed,
while the ECB (in the ESCB) is responsible for sys-
temic problems. The new supervisory framework is a
step in the second direction.
In the EU crisis, management has proven a source of
instability. The European Union has tried to achieve
compatible financial integration and cross-border
banking with national authorities in charge of super-
vision. Financial stability has suffered as a result. The
options now are to either go back on integration or to
diminish the role of national authorities. To go for-
ward with integration burden-sharing agreements for
bank resolution are needed, as well as a European
resolution and supervisory authority. The present
reform of EU financial architecture takes a middle
path, preserving the role of national authorities with
the convergence of national regimes, crisis concor-
dats, and expanded co-ordinating roles for European
financial authorities, but no burden-sharing agree-
ments in case of a solvency crisis. The new ESRB
may contribute to crisis prevention, but it will not
contribute to crisis management and resolution.
Macro-prudential supervision should be led by the
10 EEAG (2003), Chapter 4, p. 113.
11 EEAG (2003), Chapter 4, p. 114.central bank and closely coordinated with micro-pru-
dential supervision. This is particularly relevant for
systemic institutions. The new supervisory model in
the United Kingdom (see Box 3.6), with both macro-
and micro-prudential control under the wing of the
Bank of England seems sensible. Indeed, the central
bank has an advantage in monitoring macroeconom-
ic developments, can act decisively in a crisis (avoid-
ing the problem of co-ordinating agencies and com-
mittees), and can internalise the effects of monetary
policy on leverage and risk-taking. All this points
towards giving the central bank a central role in
macro-prudential control.12
The EU model is closer to the US model with a sys-
temic board in charge of macro-prudential supervi-
sion, but with three differences: in the European
Union the committee is multinational, it has no direct
control over policy instruments and can only issue
warnings, and the role of the European Commission
and the Economic and Financial Committee is pas-
sive in contrast to the active role of the Treasury in the
United States. 
The integrated supervisor is to take care of cross-bor-
der groups in the euro area. Those groups should
adhere to a European deposit insurance fund with
liability proportional to the group’s exposure to the
particular countries. The deposit insurance fund
could, at the same time, work as a resolution author-
ity (like the FDIC in the United States). A second tier
of national institutions could be supervised by
national regulators. 
A possible configuration of the euro area financial
architecture along the lines of the new UK model
would be to pull the ESRB and the EBA (and even
the EIOPA) as a subsidiary under the wing of the
ECB and keep a developed ESMA independent. This
would put macro-prudential supervision in the
hands of the ECB and would ensure coordination
and information exchange with the prudential
authority, as well as a clear line of authority in a cri-
sis situation.
The EU sovereign crisis has added another dimension
to the financial crisis linking the fate of the sovereign
and that of its banks. Problems in the banks of
Ireland and Spain have led to problems for the sover-
eign. Problems with the sovereign in Greece, Portugal
and Italy have, in turn, led to problems for their
banks. In Hannoun (2011) it is shown that market
participants have priced sovereign and banking
default risks as closely related since the bank bail-outs
of 2008–09.
The perspective of a restructuring of sovereign debt
(e.g. in Greece) with losses for investors changes the
expectations of a bail-out inducing a systemic problem
due to the confluence of the built-in instability of the
euro area (with one currency and many sovereigns),
legacy assets on the books of banks due to the crisis,
and the lack of appropriate institutions to deal with
banking crises in the European Union. In the euro
area there is the potential for a simultaneous run on
the debt and the banks of a country, since the deposit
insurance guarantees are devalued in cases where the
sovereign has no access to the international capital
market and has problems of its own. If this problem
needs to be solved via collective burden sharing, it is
up to the states to decide on rescue funds like the
EFSF, EFSM, ESM etc. Burden-sharing gives rise to
moral hazard effects and involves fiscal redistribution
among countries. As such, it needs to be controlled by
the parliaments of the participating countries. 
The treatment of sovereign exposures in the European
Union for purposes of capital requirements has
induced banks to hold large amounts of sovereign
debt and has provoked discrepancies between the
market pricing of sovereign risk and the accounting
of those risks in the banking book. This, in turn, has
led to wide divergence in the recapitalisation needs of
EU banks depending on whether market pricing or
historical cost are used to account for sovereign expo-
sures (see Box 3.5). 
3.6 Evaluation of regulatory reform
Regulatory reform should be based on the following
key principles: 
1. A central regulatory body (such as the central
bank) should have a mandate to maintain financial
stability. It is necessary to consider specific macro-
prudential measures, which take into account liquidi-
ty needs throughout the economic cycle. The Bank of
Spain’s dynamic provisions are an early example. 
2. Providing liquidity is not the same as providing
equity capital. If a systemically relevant bank needs
capital, but cannot find it in the market, it should
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be recapitalised against shares by the respective
state or states where it is located (or according to
the relevant cross-country burden sharing arrange-
ments made). Monetary policy is not the appropri-
ate tool with which to recapitalise banks.
3. Any institution which fulfils the tasks of a bank
(maturity transformations, supervision of opaque
credits) is fragile; it is subject to moments of panic
and needs the coverage of a safety net. Therefore, it
cannot avoid supervision. Regulation and supervision
Box 3.5  
The treatment of sovereign exposures in the European Union
1 
 
As of September 2011, twelve percent of the banks' sovereign debt exposures were included in the trading 
book (marked-to-market, reflected in the profit and loss account), 49 percent were classified as available for 
sale (marked-to-market, not reflected in the profit and loss account but in equity), and 39 percent were 
classified as held to maturity (valued at amortised cost net of any impairment provision). As a result, the 
pricing of sovereign risk in financial markets currently diverges from the accounting framework applicable 
to the banking book (which does not reflect the widening of sovereign spreads in the profit and loss account 
until an impairment provision is taken).  
 
Basel rules vs Brussels rules 
The Basel II standardised approach allows a zero risk weight to be applied to AAA and AA-rated sovereigns 
(see Table 3.1). However, large and sophisticated banks are expected to implement the IRB (internal ratings-
based) approach and not the standardised approach for calculating credit risk capital. The IRB approach 
requires banks to assess the credit risk of individual sovereigns using a detailed rating scale, accounting for 
all relevant measured differences in risk. However, the European Capital Requirements Directive allows a 
generalised zero risk weight for exposures to member states’ central government denominated and funded in 
the domestic currency of that central government thanks to the so-called “IRB permanent partial use” rules. 
According to these rules, a bank can apply the IRB approach to corporate, mortgage or retail exposures, but 
a zero risk weight to the sovereign debt of all EU member states. In the 2011, European stress test reports 59 
out of the 90 participating banks applied their own internal model but only 36 to sovereign risk.  
 
Table 3.1  
Risk weighting in the Basel II standardised approach 
Basel II standardised 
approach: sovereign 




A+ to A–  BBB+ to 
BBB– 
BB+ to B–  Below B–  Unrated 
Risk weight   0%  20%  50%  100%  150%  100% 
 
Three m ain criticisms  have  been r aised  about the r egulatory treatment  of  sovereign r isk that provides 
incentives for banks to accumulate large sovereign exposures: (i) a zero risk weight is applied to AAA and 
AA-rated  sovereigns;  (ii) t he  new liquidity coverage r atio  advocated  in t he B asel III proposals c ould 
encourage banks to hold more sovereign debt, and (iii) the large exposure regime in Europe excludes highly 
rated sovereigns from the 25 percent of equity limit on large exposures.  
 
Recognition of sovereign risk in stress tests and the new capital buffer requirement 
In July 2011, the EU banking stress test included haircuts applied to sovereign exposures in the trading book 
and increased impairment provisions for these exposures in the banking book. To prevent underestimation of 
risk for sovereign debt held in the banking book, the EBA has developed a much more rigorous approach 
than previously adopted and the probabilities of default based on external ratings (Table 3.2) are no longer 
zero.  
 
Table 3.2  
Risk weighting based on external ratings 
Probability of default used in the EU wide stress test 
for sovereign exposures Standard & Poor’s rating  
Average two-year probability of default implied by 
external ratings in % (EBA calculations)  
AAA to AA     0.03  
A     0.26  
BBB     0.64  
BB     2.67  
B     9.71  
CCC-C   36.15  
 should spread to all entities which carry out banking
activities. 
4. Expected losses of liabilities guaranteed by the
government should be covered by a risk premium
determined by the market dependent on the risk
assumed by the entity. At the same time, the fact
that banks which act under the protection of
national safety nets are not monitored (moral haz-
ard) makes it necessary to limit their range of activ-
ities (particularly, high-risk activities like propri-
etary trading).13
5. Institutions that play a key role in the financial sys-
tem (where the TBTF doctrine is applied) should be
regulated so that they internalise the potential exter-
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1 This box is based on Hannoun (2011). 
2 The buffer was motivated by the exposure to Greek sovereign risk of European banks (mostly concerning French and 
German banks, as well as Greek banks). However, due to the general valuation at market prices (implying a revaluation 
of French and German debt) the institutions standing in line for more capital behind Greek banks were their Spanish 
counterparts (which had virtually no exposure to Greek debt). It is worth noting that the EBA is not proposing changes in 
the accounting treatment of sovereign exposures. 
 
continued: Box 3.5 
 
Furthermore,  at  the  summit  of  the  European U nion  in O ctober  2011,  systemic  banks  were  required  to 
strengthen their capital positions by building up an exceptional and temporary capital buffer to address 
current market concerns over sovereign risk reflecting current market prices. The requirement of the EBA is 
to reach a Core Tier 1 capital ratio of 9 percent by the end of June 2012. Sovereign exposures in the Held-to-
Maturity portfolio, as well as in the loans and receivables portfolio, shall be valued at market value using 
haircuts which differ per maturity and per country.
2 
 
Box 3.6  
New regulatory architecture in the United Kingdom 
 
The reform of the financial regulatory system in the United Kingdom focuses on the transfer of functions from the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA), in an integrated (“one peak”) model, towards a “two peak” model in which 
prudential supervision and the conduct of business regulation functions are separated. The Bank of England (BoE) 
will include the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) and the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) (as a subsidiary) 
in charge of macro-prudential and micro-prudential regulation, respectively, while the independent Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) will be in charge of the conduct-of-business supervision.
1 
 
In the new architecture, the FPC will be responsible for systemic risk identification and monitoring. The FPC will 
have powers to make recommendations on a “comply or explain” basis to the PRA and the FCA.
2 The PRA will 
carry out firm-specific regulation of deposit-taking institutions, insurers and the larger, more complex investment 
firms, from a systemic risk perspective. The FCA will be responsible for regulating conduct of business in the retail 
and wholesale banking, investment, securities and insurance markets; supervising the trading infrastructure 
supporting those markets; and for the prudential regulation of firms beyond the scope of the PRA.
3 The FCA’s 
three operational goals are securing an appropriate degree of protection for consumers; promoting efficiency and 
choice in the market for financial services; and protecting and enhancing the integrity of the UK financial system. 
The FCA, insofar as is consistent with its general objectives, must promote competition as a significant driver of 
good conduct by firms.
4  
 
The government wants to impose a legal duty for the FCA to exercise its functions in co-ordination with the PRA 
supported by a statutory requirement to agree on a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), concerning the 
operation of the regulatory process of dual-regulated firms (deposit-takers, insurers and significant investment 
firms) and consolidated supervision of groups.
5  
 
1 See HM Treasury (2011a,b) and FSA (2011).  
2 The FPC will be chaired by the Governor of the BoE and made up of independent members and is expected to be established by 
the end of 2012.  
3 The scope of the FCA includes both exchange-operated markets and over-the-counter (OTC) dealing. The BoE will be in charge 
of clearing and settlement infrastructure. 
4 Possible measures intended to reduce market power include those helping to reduce barriers to entry or exit, and with searching 
or switching consumers’ decisions. 
5 Some elements considered in the future arrangement would be supervisory colleges to assess risks related to a firm or group of 
firms and to avoid conflicting regulations, authorisation processes, provision from FCA to inform PRA before applying 
enforcement actions, and coordination in rule-making and policy setting. 
 
13 See Matutes and Vives (2000).EEAG Report 2012 95
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nal effects of their bankruptcy. This can be achieved
by means of Pigouvian taxes levied on institutions
according to their contribution to systemic risk or by
higher equity requirements.14 Due to the presence of
these institutions in global markets, regulatory stan-
dards should be uniform and accompanied by inter-
nationally coordinated supervision. 
6. A fragmentary approach to financial regulation
does not work. It is necessary to consider both capital
and liquidity needs and the degree of market liberali-
sation;15 an alignment of incentives should be encour-
aged in the system, particularly at all levels, from the
Board of Directors to the client, including executives,
analysts, traders and credit rating agencies. 
7. It is necessary to establish mechanisms to prevent
the delay of the supervisor’s intervention while the
balance sheets of financial institutions deteriorate
and capital declines (regulatory forbearance). This
has been a typical problem in financial crises, which
only make them last longer and increases the damage
caused. 
The proposed regulatory reform measures are gener-
ally in line with the stated reform principles. The ques-
tion is whether the reform will prove to be ambitious
and effective enough. So far, the lack of concreteness
has not offered a clear answer, but there are scenarios
in which the reforms may fade. 
It is yet to be seen if proposals in Basel III will end up
setting sufficient standards and not distorting capital
and liquidity requirements. Proposals regarding liq-
uidity will affect maturity transformation in the bank-
ing sector, since they attempt to limit it and could
penalise retail banking (if deposit finance is consid-
ered relatively unstable). The foreseeable influence
over the shifting border between intermediation and
market is more complex. Asset liquidity requirements
will render credit less attractive and bonds more
attractive, particularly treasuries. This was certainly
the case before the EU sovereign debt crisis; and as
regards liabilities, retail deposits will be prioritised ver-
sus non-secured wholesale funds. The outcome could
be a shift to assets disintermediation and liabilities re-
intermediation. In fact, maybe there is some tension
between the tendency to monitor and reduce securiti-
zation on the one hand, and higher capital and liquid-
ity requirements for credit entities, on the other.
Indeed, perhaps the banking sector could turn into a
kind of narrow bank (where deposits are invested in
safe, liquid assets such as public debt, at least before
the sovereign debt crisis). Should this be the case, then
the first question would be: who will carry out maturi-
ty transformation, which used to be the remit of tradi-
tional banking? If this task is given to non-regulated
entities, the problem of the parallel banking sector will
reappear and entities, which turn illiquid assets into
liquid liabilities, will continue to be vulnerable, and if
they are systemic, they will continue to be rescued. 
The accounting treatment of sovereign debt for the
purposes of capital requirements and, more generally,
the use of marked-to-market in the accounting of
banks’ assets will continue to be a debated issue.
Indeed, the use of marked-to-market accounting in
banking is pro-cyclical and has been criticised on the
grounds that it induces more instability and because
asset prices in crisis situations may not reflect funda-
mental values due to coordination problems, informa-
tion and liquidity frictions (see Adrian and Shin 2010,
Allen et al. 2009, Plantin et al. 2008). The situation in
the euro area with one currency and many sovereigns
questions the wisdom of putting a zero weight on sov-
ereign debt for the purposes of calculating the risky
assets of a bank. A sovereign that controls its own
currency can always avoid speculative runs on its debt
by threatening to print money. This is not the case for
euro area countries, which issue debt denominated in
a currency they do not control. Risk weights for sov-
ereign debt using appropriately market-based infor-
mation should be used in the euro area and the
European Union in general.
As regards reforms in the United States, the Dodd-
Frank Act leaves regulation implementation at the
discretion of the regulator. Effects will therefore
depend upon its implementation. Thus, the law calls
for new regulations (there were an estimated 200 new
rules by eleven different entities). In addition, the
great freedom granted to the regulator may be prob-
lematic based on the experiences of past crises. Rules
that call for intervention under objective circum-
stances may prove superior.16 
A second question is how to prevent implicit and
explicit insurance mechanisms, together with limited
14 See, for example, Acharya et al. (2010).
15 See Vives (2011c) for an analysis of the necessary links between
capital, liquidity and competition regulation
16 For example, under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act (FDICIA 1991), when solvency drops below min-
imum levels, a bank may not expand its assets. When solvency drops
again, recapitalisation may be needed or maximum interest rates may
have to be changed on loans and deposits. FDICIA aims to reduce
the discretional regulatory right through strict intervention rules,
which are to be gradually applied (see Dewatripont and Tirole 1994).responsibility and opacity of bank assets, from leading
to excessive risk-taking. Improvements in resolution
mechanisms and efforts to balance sheet transparency
are palliative elements, but the problem will persist.
The question is whether the subtle separation of activ-
ities proposed in the modified Volcker rule will go far
enough. The issue is particularly important for sys-
temic entities. In this case, it is worth pointing out that
what matters as regards systemic risk is the specialisa-
tion, connections and position of a bank in the finan-
cial system, rather than its size, as can be seen from the
Lehman Brothers’ case. Besides, in terms of a bank’s
scope, what causes market problems is the conflict of
interest between different activities, whose control
should guide possible structural remedies of activity
separation. The question is whether enough mecha-
nisms to monitor the conflicts of interests inherent in
financial conglomerates have been activated. In gener-
al, taxes that aim to repair the damage caused by sys-
temic institutions are superior to restrictions accord-
ing to the size of the entities. However, governments
favour taxes and levies as a source of revenue (and a
way to recover the cost of bank bail-outs), rather than
as a way to correct externalities. There is debate over
whether ex ante taxes or insurance funds are preferable
to ex post taxes to finance bail-outs. Ex ante taxing is
preferable as long as it discriminates between the dif-
ferent entities according to their risk profile. Proposals
to tax only debt-financed assets ignore other sources
of systemic risk (such as entities interconnections).
The proposed FTT in the Euro  pean Union may raise
substantial revenues, but it is doubtful that it will help
to diminish systemic risk, and its effects on price
volatility may be ambiguous. Furthermore, the burden
of the FTT is most likely to fall on consumers of
financial products. Potential benefits of the FTT are
that it may correct potential under-taxation of the
financial sector due to the VAT exemption and curb
the potentially damaging effects of high-frequency
trading (where the incentives to invest in and react to
information ahead of the market may be excessive).
All in all the FTT should stand or fall on its effective-
ness to correct the negative externalities of “excessive”
financial transactions, rather than on being an instru-
ment to raise revenue (for which other instruments
may be more effective and less distortionary).17
Other aspects of the regulatory reform can also be
questioned. It is questionable, for example, whether
corporate governance reforms can be effective with-
out addressing the fundamental problem of incentives
generated by deposit insurance and bail-outs of
TBTF entities which, together with limited responsi-
bility, lead shareholders to take excessive risks from a
social point of view. It is not clear that restrictions on
short selling improve the functioning of the market
when the real problem is market manipulation.
Another issue is how to make sure that credit rating
agencies incentives are socially aligned. 
Regulatory reform may have a remarkable impact on
the degree of internationalisation of the banking sec-
tor. In fact, capital requirements for minority owner-
ship will have important consequences in the interna-
tional expansion of financial entities, and the tenden-
cy to isolate entities’ problems in the countries where
they arise may offer incentives to create supranation-
al entities with a collection of capitalised, indepen-
dently regulated and supervised subsidiaries (in the
European Union, for example, replacing branch
offices with national subsidiaries). This may curb
European financial integration. 
3.7 Conclusions
The crisis has laid bare major weaknesses in the regu-
lation and supervision of the financial system and it
leaves more doubts and questions than certainties
about steps to be taken in the future. Regulation faces
the challenge of making the financial system more
resistant and stable without hindering development,
while protecting public interest, innovation and pre-
serving globalisation. A strong response to this chal-
lenge is crucial since the financial system plays a key
role in economic growth. There is no contradiction
between the stability of the financial system and eco-
nomic growth. On the contrary, an unstable financial
system will imply high cost for the economy because
of the incidence of crises and because it directs too
much capital into risky activities. The financial sector,
which is perceived to have enjoyed excessive returns
and taken excessive risks in the past, now faces the
need to recover confidence and its reputation, and to
adapt to a new and stricter regulatory atmosphere. 
Hence, the financial sector will have to adjust the size
to its contribution to the development of the econo-
my. Regulatory changes will have a significant effect
on defining business models and strategies for the in  -
ternationalisation of financial intermediaries, though,
for the time being, uncertainty is high because many
of the planned reforms have not yet been specifically
formulated. The reform process seems to be going in
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the right direction, although we shall have to await the
implementation phase in order to be able to assess its
effectiveness.
In the European Union the reform of financial archi-
tecture is pressing due to the persistent banking prob-
lems related to the sovereign debt crisis. The euro area
should be stabilised with a credible liquidity facility
for solvent sovereigns facing speculative attacks and
with a restructuring facility for countries that are
insolvent or face what we had called in our last year’s
report “impending insolvency”.18 Furthermore, its
financial architecture must be completed. The ECB
should explicitly assume the function of guarantor of
the financial system (in terms of liquidity provision to
private banks, not to recapitalise insolvent banks with
artificially reduced interest rates) and should have suf-
ficient supervisory powers over systemic institutions
and macro-prudential control. It would also be advis-
able to link the European prudential authority more
closely with the ESCB. A formal framework of crisis
resolution should be established and the chain of
command in a crisis situation needs to be clearly iden-
tified with the ECB at its centre. Furthermore, burden
sharing agreements for bank resolution have to be put
in place together with a European resolution authori-
ty that can be combined with a European deposit
insurance fund for institutions that can potentially
generate systemic problems in the financial system in
the euro area.
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